Three minutes to understand the Zircuit sorter mechanism

Zircuit enables the SLS mechanism, which is designed to isolate "malicious transactions".

Author: 0xTodd

Taking advantage of Zircuit's $ZRC official TGE, let's talk about an interesting mechanism in this project related to the sequencer.

Zircuit has its own L2, which is characterized by a solution called "Sequencer Level Security (SLS)".

We all know that the import and export of transactions in L2 are currently sorted through the official sorter of the project party. Of course, due to the existence of ZK/ challenge proof, we are not generally worried about the sorter being malicious.

Overall, the sorter is a neutral role, always executing each transaction justly and impartially.

So, even though the sorter is neutral, can we make an effort to let it join the camp of kindness?

So, Zircuit has enabled this SLS mechanism, which is designed to isolate "malicious transactions".

Normally, how does an L2 transaction get onto the chain? It's a simple four-step process:

1. Users initiate transactions and broadcast

2. Transaction goes to mempool (mempool) and waits

3. As a neutral camp, help it pack into the Block

4. Trading on-chain

But based on the SLS mechanism, this step has been transformed into five steps:

1. Users initiate transactions and broadcast

2. Transaction goes to mempool (mempool) and waits

3. As a good camp, the sorter uses some tools to check whether the transactions are malicious.

4. If there is no malicious intent, help pack it into the Block.

5. On-chain Trading

But what if there is a suspected malicious transaction? It changes from step four:

4. If suspected of malice, enter the isolation pool

5. The isolation pool is verified without error, and the sorter continues to pack it.

Or:

4. If suspected of malice, enter the isolation pool

5. If the isolation pool review finds that it is indeed a malicious transaction, then refuse to package it on the chain.

The SLS checks for malicious standards and may use some Open Source libraries and AI assistance for judgment.

There is hope for achieving certain effects in the future, such as stolen assets that may never be transferred or crossed back to L1. It is still meaningful for the current hostile on-chain environment, which is like a dark forest.

Of course, since it is a transaction audit, it is inevitable that there may be some collateral damage. However, I understand that by improving the Algorithm of the isolation pool, it can actually drop such issues as much as possible.

This is a double-edged sword, blockchain emphasizes permissionless, which is slightly contrary to SLS. From the perspective of normal users, such L2 is indeed safer.

But overall, I feel that although there is a slight impact on permissionless, the increase in security, especially in protecting inexperienced users, is still worth it.

At the end, attached: the original paper of Zircuit's SLS mechanism: